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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-3928 
 ___________ 
 
 JOHNY DIMANCHE 
         
 v. 
 
YVETTE TAY-TAYLOR, Office of Detention and Removal for U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement; WILLIAM JOYCE, Assistant Field Office Director, Office of 
Detention and Removal for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 
CHRISTOPHER SHANAHAN, New York Field Office Director for the Office of 
Detention and Removal for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; SHAUN 
GOLDEN, Director of Monmouth County Correctional Facility; 
SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; 
BRIAN ELWOOD, Warden of Monmouth County Correctional Facility, 
 
                                                                   Appellants 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 3:12-cv-03831) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Anne E. Thompson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
 Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 15, 2013 
 Before:  AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges  
 
 (Opinion filed : September 3, 2013) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 In this appeal of a successful 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition, the 
Government requests that we summarily reverse the District Court’s order, contending 
that it is squarely abrogated by our recent decision in Sylvain v. Attorney General, 714 
F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2013).  We agree in part, and, for the following reasons, we will 
summarily vacate (rather than reverse) the District Court’s judgment. 
 The parties are familiar with the background of this appeal and appear to agree on 
the basic points of the petitioner-appellee’s history in the criminal justice system, so we 
need not tarry in our discussion.  In brief: Johny Dimanche, a citizen of Haiti, was 
charged with being removable under subsections of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) requiring his mandatory detention during removal proceedings.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c).  The Notice to Appear was issued in 2012, and Dimanche—who had been 
released from his previous custodial sentence in 2007 and was not presently 
incarcerated—was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement.   
 Through counsel, Dimanche petitioned for habeas corpus relief, asking for release 
(on recognizance or under bond, parole, or supervision) or, in the alternative, for an 
individualized hearing before an Immigration Judge at which the Government would 
“bear the burden of establishing that Mr. Dimanche’s continued detention is justified.”  
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Am. Pet. 11, ECF No. 16.
1
  Central to Dimanche’s argument was the belief that 
mandatory detention under § 1226(c) was not warranted when ICE custody did not 
immediately follow imprisonment resulting from one of the offenses enumerated in the 
statute.  See Am. Pet. ¶ 16–17.  Dimanche’s reference to an individualized hearing was 
explained further in his memorandum of law, where he alleged that the “only available 
means of challenging the applicability of the mandatory detention statute in this case”—a 
so-called “Joseph hearing” pursuant to In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999)—
was “contrary to the requirements of the Constitution,” because it impermissibly shifted 
the burden of proof to the alien and amounted to a mere “cursory review” of his custody 
status.
2
  Pet’r’s Mem. 12, ECF No. 2-2. 
 Holding that § 1226(c) did not authorize the mandatory detention of Dimanche, 
the District Court granted habeas relief.  Surveying the many relevant cases decided in 
the District of New Jersey, the Court observed that “the vast majority . . .  have held” that 
                                                 
1
 The amended habeas corpus petition is functionally identical to the original; it was 
submitted because the first was missing a necessary party.  See Pet’r’s Reply 2, ECF No. 
18. 
 
2
 A Joseph hearing “is immediately provided to a detainee who claims that he is not 
covered by § 1226(c).”  Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 514 n.3 (2003).  “At the hearing, 
the detainee may avoid mandatory detention by demonstrating that he is not an alien, was 
not convicted of the predicate crime, or that [ICE] is otherwise substantially unlikely to 
establish that he is in fact subject to mandatory detention.”  Id.  We have observed that 
the “question [of] the constitutional adequacy of a Joseph hearing” is an “open one,” and 
“at least one circuit judge has expressed grave doubts as to whether Joseph is consistent 
with due process of law.”  Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 231 n.8 (3d Cir. 
2011) (citing both Kim and Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(Tashima, J., concurring)).   
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§ 1226(c) only applies when detention follows immediately after release from 
incarceration.  See Dimanche v. Tay-Taylor, No. 12-3831, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
116432, at *6–8 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2012).  One of the cases relied upon by the District 
Court was Sylvain v. Holder, No. 11-3006, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69591 (D.N.J. June 
28, 2011), which was then pending before us on appeal.  The Court ordered that 
Dimanche be provided with an individualized bond hearing.  Dimanche posted the 
$15,000 bond, was released from detention, and presently resides in Fort Greene.   
 The Government timely appealed the District Court’s order.  Dimanche is pro se; 
his attorney has withdrawn.   
 After the Government filed its brief, but before Dimanche responded, we issued 
our opinion in Sylvain, holding that § 1226(c) does not require ICE detention to 
immediately follow an alien’s release from incarceration and reversing the District Court 
decision to the contrary.  See Sylvain v. Att’y Gen., 714 F.3d 150, 161 (3d Cir. 2013).3  
We explained that the alleged temporal ambiguity of the statutory language (“when the 
alien is released”) was of no moment, because “nothing in the statute suggests that 
immigration officials lose authority [to detain] if they delay.”  Id. at 157.   
 In light of Sylvain, the Government now presents a motion for summary action 
pursuant to 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.  The Government argues that the 
decision reached by the District Court is squarely controlled by Sylvain, such that Sylvain 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
3
 We denied en banc rehearing in Sylvain on July 12, 2013.   
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functionally overturned it; there are “no other issues to resolve.”  Mot. for Summ. Action 
11.  The Clerk stayed the briefing schedule pending our resolution of the Government’s 
motion.  Dimanche has not filed a response. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Sylvain, 714 F.3d at 155.  
Our review is de novo.  See Khouzam v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 235, 244 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Summary action is appropriate when an appeal does not present a substantial question.  
See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 We agree with the Government that this matter is squarely controlled by Sylvain.  
The District Court determined that § 1226(c) did not authorize Dimanche’s mandatory 
detention because the delay between his release from his prior custodial term and his 
apprehension by ICE placed him outside its reach.  Under Sylvain, that outcome was 
incorrect.  Because no other issue has been presented on appeal, summary action is 
appropriate.  Thus, we grant the Government’s motion to the extent it requests summary 
action and will vacate the District Court’s judgment on that ground, remanding for any 
further proceedings that the District Court deems appropriate.
4
  In so doing, we 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
4
 Of course, a prevailing party may “defend the judgment below on any ground which the 
law and the record permit, provided the asserted ground would not expand the relief 
which has been granted.”  Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 n.6 (1982).  Thus, that the 
District Court ruled only on a narrow ground invalidated by Sylvain would not 
necessarily prevent us from affirming on an alternative theory, were one presented.   
 
As discussed above the margin, Dimanche requested the relief of a constitutionally 
compliant individualized hearing in both his original petition and its amendment.  See 
Pet. 10, ECF No. 1; Am. Pet. 11.  In his memorandum of law, to which he referred in 
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“effectively den[y] [Dimanche’s] original habeas petition and thus make[] him ineligible 
for a bond hearing under § 1226(a),” thereby “set[ting] aside th[e previous bond] 
proceeding.”  Sylvain, 714 F.3d at 161 n.12. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
both petitions, Dimanche expanded upon this reference by arguing the alleged 
constitutional insufficiency of a Joseph hearing.  However, this Joseph claim was not the 
focal point of the litigation below—understandably, as the District Court’s original 
reading of § 1226(c) meant that resolving the Joseph claim was unnecessary.  
 
In this case, the amended habeas corpus petition superseded the original.  See Newell v. 
Hanks, 283 F.3d 827, 834 (7th Cir. 2002); cf. Snyder v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 303 F.3d 
271, 276 (3d Cir. 2002).  Because the memorandum of law was referenced in both 
petitions, it appears that the Joseph claim was properly raised below and was not 
eliminated by the amendment.  See also Fleishman v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 698 F.3d 598, 608 
(7th Cir. 2012); cf. New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463, 471 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(refusing to review claim when it “was not raised in the complaint, nor, apparently, in 
plaintiffs’ briefs to the district court”).  Thus, we will vacate the District Court’s decision 
rather than reversing it.  We express no opinion on the merits of Dimanche’s Joseph 
claim, and we recognize that the District Court retains discretion in deciding whether an 
argument has been preserved.  See, e.g., Alexander v. Hedback, 718 F.3d 762, 766 (8th 
Cir. 2013) (ruling, in the context of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion, that “[t]he district 
court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Alexander’s attempt to raise a . . . claim by 
brief.”). 
 
